

Exclusive and Inclusive Religious and National Values: The Case of American Views on Israel

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Abstract

Why do Americans who highly value the distinctiveness of American culture sympathize with Israel, a foreign country? Highly valuing one's own religious or national group can be associated with unilateral foreign policy preferences and less consideration of the interests of outgroups, and yet, Israel is clearly a foreign and non-Christian country which is nonetheless treated as an ingroup by Americans who believe in American exceptionalism and Christians who believe in the correctness of their religion. The high-profile relationship between American conservatives and Israel is common knowledge but contradicts the expected relationship between national identity and foreign policy preferences. This paper uses mediation analysis to study the content of identity, the religious and national values, of those Americans who sympathize with Israel. I also contrast these values with the identity of those Americans who do not sympathize with Israel. Holding exclusive religious values, those which strengthen the boundaries of a religious group against outsiders, is associated with holding national values which similarly define the boundaries of American nationality. I show that those with these values of American identity favor Israel due to its alliance with the United States, anti-Islamic sentiment, and pro-Jewish sentiment by comparing views towards Israel with views towards other Middle Eastern countries and religious groups. Those mechanisms do not exist among those with inclusive versions of national identity. This deepens knowledge on American popular opinion towards Israel, identity and foreign policy preferences, and the content of national identity.

Introduction

Why do Americans who highly value the distinctiveness of American culture sympathize with Israel, a foreign country? Many Americans-- particularly ones who value American exceptionalism (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008) and the correctness of Christianity (Guth 2011)-- sympathize with the State of Israel. While this relationship may seem obvious in popular culture, it should not be. A belief in the correctness of one's own country, variously referred to as "ethnocentrism" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), "nationalism" (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008), or "exceptionalism" (Guth 2011), is often associated with negative feelings towards outgroups (Kam and Kinder 2007), while Israel is a foreign and non-Christian country. Of course, despite this, these Americans do not apparently consider Israel an outsider; for this subset of Americans, their religious values and national values may be inclusive of it. This begs the question of which religious and national values American supporters of Israel have that allow them to hold strong sympathies for the State of Israel. Holders of exclusive religious values—that is, values which strengthen the boundaries of religious identity and differentiate the group from outsiders—may be likely to hold similar exclusive values of their national identity—that is, values which differentiate the national group from outsiders. In turn, those with exclusive national values sympathize more with Israel. Israel arguably protects the United States as defined by this version of American national identity: Israel has an alliance with the United States, is known to have conflicts with Islamist groups like the United States does, and represents the Jewish people, who are viewed relatively favorably. I show, first, that exclusive religious values increase sympathy for Israel through exclusive national values, and, second, that exclusive national values are associated with more favorable views for allies of the United States, less favorable views of Muslims, and more favorable views of Jews.

At the same time, support for Israel is far from universal among Americans: for example, in 2015, while 29 percent of respondents preferred that the United States lean toward Israel in its policy regarding the conflict, rather than some other option, such as being neutral, most respondents did not want the United States to favor Israel (Telhami 2015). I argue that those who hold inclusive religious values—that is, values which reduce the differences between the religious group from outsiders—are more likely to hold inclusive views of their American national identity. I show that inclusive religious values reduce sympathy for Israel by means of encouraging a more inclusive American national identity. Those with this identity care less about favoring allies and have more favorable views of Muslims. Thus, exclusive sympathy in favor of Israel relies, in part, on a relatively narrower version of American national identity which depends on a narrower version of religious identity. These are not universally held among Americans.

Exclusive and Inclusive Values

The literature on foreign policy preferences has used many classification schemes for religious values, such as the distinction between theology and social theology (Guth 2012) or between traditionalism and modernism (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008). However, the distinctions in these schemes cannot easily be applied beyond religious values. Drawing on social identity theory, Djupe and Calfano (2013) study the effect of religious values on foreign policy preferences by distinguishing inclusive and exclusive religious values. The former emphasizes the distinctiveness of the group and seek to preserve it, while the latter “define ingroup boundaries expansively” (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 644). In other words, an inclusive value de-emphasizes group boundaries, and so expands the practical definition of the in-group, while an exclusive value emphasizes group boundaries and so focus attention on a smaller, more

specific group of people (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 658). This principle of emphasis or de-emphasis on group boundaries can apply to any number of situations where “group tensions can be analogized” (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 658). The distinction is similar to that which has been used in studies of national identity (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009). Therefore, the distinction between inclusive and exclusive values forms a reasonable basis to investigate the relationship between religious values and national values and how they combine to influence foreign policy preferences.

By values, I mean general standards against which the world is evaluated (Connors 2019, 3). By religious values, I mean values related to religion; these generally involve how religious adherents should evaluate how they live their lives and how religious communities should evaluate their orientation to the world (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 645). Religion naturally involves both inclusive and exclusive values. Religions make a claim to hold exclusive truths and demand the preservation of these truths; since these are characteristics within the group and not outside the group, the need to uphold religious truths is an exclusive value (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 646). I will refer to this value, the duty to uphold and preserve the spiritual truths of the religion, as “evangelism duty”. Djupe and Calfano (2013, 651) also argue that a belief in an importance to “keep company” with fellow believers is another example of an exclusive religious boundary. As with truth claims, it focuses on preserving the boundaries of the religious group. Connections are focused on those people inside the religion. I will refer to this value as “coreligionist duty”, the duty to care especially for fellow believers.

Even while many religions have exclusive values, including what I call evangelism and coreligionist duties, at the same time, many of the same religions also encourage believers to engage in outreach to others not currently in the fold through “openness and communion with

others”, outside the community (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 647). This generates inclusive religious values which involve calls to “love the stranger”, to “invite others to church even if the church begins to change as a result” (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 651), or aiding marginalized groups (Brown and Brown 2015, 498). These values de-emphasize the differences between people inside the religion and outside, and attempt to reduce the boundaries, even if parts of the definition of the group changes. I will focus on a single inclusive religious value, the value of treating outsiders equally to insiders, which I will refer to as “equality duty”.

Knowing that traditional religious values are associated with a stronger national identity (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Guth 2012) and that there are different forms of national identity (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009), I next consider which forms of national identity, which national values, are affiliated with exclusive religious values. Again, by values, I mean general standards against which the world is evaluated (Connors 2019, 3). Therefore, by national values, I mean standards by which the national group is compared to the world in general and how members of the national group should orient their lives. (This is analogous to the role of religious values in a religious group (c.f. Djupe and Calfano 2013, 645).) National values can be considered part of the content national identity: how an individual who identifies as part of the nation considers that group to be distinct relative to the rest of the world. (These are not to be confused with policy preferences or aspirations.)

Like religious values, national values can be classified by how inclusive or exclusive values, that is, by how much they emphasize the boundaries of the group. National values may not often be as exclusive as the religious claim to universal truth, for example, but they can still be placed on a relative continuum. Some national values may approach being totally exclusive: “chauvinism” insists that one’s own nation is better and should be universally emulated

(Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009, 726). This is an exclusive value because it implies that the in-group possesses unique characteristics which must be protected against outsiders who would threaten these characteristics. More common are exclusive national values based on “culturalism”, the idea that the national group is defined by cultural traits which are not easily changeable, such as speaking a particular language or belonging to a specific religion (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009). These national values are also exclusive values because they place particular value on the boundaries of the group and maintaining the definition of the group as it is currently.

Religious and National Identity and Foreign Policy Views

I study these values for three reasons. First, I investigate the puzzle of how exclusive religious and national values can lead to more sympathy with a foreign country, Israel. Second, I study the impact on foreign policy views from inclusive values of religious and national identity as well as more commonly studied exclusive values (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Gries 2014, 194; Guth 2011). Third, I extend the research on the role of religion and national identity in foreign policy preferences by providing an additional breakdown of national values, or the possible forms of national identity which individuals may hold (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009). These contributions will provide a more complete picture on the identity of Americans who sympathize with Israel and a clear comparison with those Americans who do not.

Ideology, religious views, and identity (Mayer 2004; Koplow 2011; Cavari 2013; 2014) all influence Americans’ views of Israel, even while other factors such as partisanship and elite cues (Cavari and Freedman 2017), attentiveness to the conflict (Krosnick and Telhami 1995), media coverage (Leep and Coen 2016) matter as well. Religious factors have a greater impact

on sympathy for Israel than security or economic interests among citizens in many countries, including the US (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019). Evangelical Christians are more than twice as likely as other Americans to prefer a foreign policy more favorable to Israel (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008, 177). Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008) show that *both* attentiveness to religious leaders *and* an exclusive religious value (Biblical fundamentalism) increase the likelihood that respondents hold an exclusive national value (the belief that other countries should follow the example of the United States), which, in turn, increases support for Israel. Gries (2014, 194) and Guth (2011) further evidence for the role of exclusive religious values in support for Israel beyond denominational affiliation or intensity of religious practice. Recently, Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2020) have found more evidence for the impact of Biblical literalism. However, they show that support for Israel among American Evangelical Christians is better explained by a belief in a cultural affinity with Jews, a favorable opinion of Jews, and the idea that Jews are God's chosen people.

Religious identity, religious beliefs, and religious leadership can all impact views of Israel, but no overarching framework links these concepts. Value exclusivity and inclusivity can help unite these several religious factors of support for Israel into a broader, unified framework that explains which kind of religious factors can lead to support for Israel. Moreover, the finding by Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2020) that some Evangelical Christian Americans believe in a cultural affinity with Jews requires further explanation. This paper helps explain which kind of national identity these Americans hold by looking at inclusive and exclusive versions of national identity.

Beyond the research on Americans' views of Israel, this paper also adds to the research on religious values and foreign policy preferences. Previous research on religious core values

(Roy 2016), including those involving views of Israel (Guth 2013), have largely focused on religious values like Biblical literalism which lead to a more militaristic foreign policy orientation. However, in least some circumstances, religious belief can also increase the likelihood of cooperative foreign policy views (Petrikova 2018). Moreover, studies on psychological values and foreign policy preferences shows that universalism also increases the likelihood of a cooperative internationalist outlook (Rathbun et al. 2016). While “binding” values like authority are associated with a militant foreign policy outlook, “individualizing” or “fairness/reciprocity” values are associated with a cooperative outlook on foreign policy (Kertzer et al. 2014). Considering that there are different kinds of psychological values which affect foreign policy preferences differently and that religion can lead to different kinds of foreign policy preferences depending on context, there should be more study on which kinds of religious values have which impacts on foreign policy preferences.

Finally, this paper also adds to the research on the content of national identity on foreign policy preferences. American national identity has long been contested (Rynhold 2015, 10; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001, 76) between a set of civic beliefs, the “Creed” and cultural traits like the English language have also been considered important (Schildkraut 2014). In a time of increasing ideological polarization, there are increasingly two versions of American national identity: “a view that greater protection and support of the equal rights of citizens is necessary” and a “second viewpoint reflected a more central psychological and classically affective attachment to the concept of the nation and its symbols” (Hanson and O’Dwyer 2019, 790). Both forms of identity matter for foreign policy: an exclusive belief related to national identity (that other countries ought to be similar to the United States) (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008) while cosmopolitan identity increases support for foreign aid (Bayram 2017).

Despite this, there have been few studies that compare the impact of different forms of national identity on foreign policy preferences. Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti (2009) show that “chauvinism”, a belief that one’s own nation is superior and should be emulated by others, and “culturalism”, the belief that a nation depends on cultural, rather than civic traits increases militarism, while mere “attachment”, the degree to which people feel a sense of belonging to their nation. Chauvinism and attachment also impact perceptions of foreign economic competition differently (Herrmann 2017, 72). This paper extends the research on national identity content and foreign policy preferences by studying whether the different impact of different forms of national identity extends to views on Israel. Studying Germany, Rathbun, Powers, and Anders (2019) show that national attachment changes the effect of moral values on foreign policy preferences. However, how religious values impact foreign policy preferences by influencing national values has not been studied. This paper further contributes to the research on foreign policy and national identity by filling this gap.

This paper furthers the research on American views of Israel, the effect of religious values and foreign policy preferences, and the effect of national identity content on foreign policy preferences. I do this by examining the impact of both inclusive and exclusive religious values on both inclusive and exclusive national values and disaggregating different kinds of national values. This will help show why some Americans seem to identify with Israel.

The Relationship between Religious and National Values

Individuals who hold exclusive religious values should be more likely to also hold exclusive national values. Again, values are standard against which an individual evaluates oneself as well as evaluates the group in relation to other groups, and exclusive values emphasize boundaries. Values which seek “solidarity and cohesion” attempt “to guard against internal and

external threats” (Rathbun et al. 2016, 125). To seek this solidarity and cohesion implies a need for “conformity, tradition, and security” (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128) and “self-restraint, social stability, resistance to change, and deference to established traditions and cultural dictates” (Rathbun et al. 2016, 127). These establish “binding foundations” which keep the group cohesive (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829). People seeking to defend the cohesiveness of their group are sensitive to threats to a group’s symbols (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015, 204). So, holders of exclusive religious values are concerned about threats to their religious group. They evaluate the group by its ability to preserve cohesion with its distinct characteristics and they evaluate themselves by identifying with these symbolic characteristics and seek to preserve them.

Those concerned about preserving the boundaries of their religious group will also be concerned about preserving the boundaries of their national group as “religious identity is often intertwined with ethnic identity, and thus...religion and ethnicity are sometimes inextricably linked” (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtmanche 2015, 204). Religion provides a “comprehensive conception of the world”, a “framework that helps individuals understand what actions are acceptable”, and “demarcates group boundaries” (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 211). So, people who are concerned about demarcating group boundaries in their religious group may be inspired by this to seek to preserve boundaries related to their other identities.

Concern for religious boundaries logically extends to a concern for boundaries of national identity in the United States because the nation has been identified with aspects of Christianity throughout its history. “[F]rom the earliest years of the republic”, influential political elites have defined the country by drawing on “a collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things...institutionalized in a collectivity” (Bellah 1967). Religious symbolism has

been used as part of national discourse in the United States ever since (Wuthnow 1988, 244; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 211-2). This has made some symbols- though not all (Bellah 1967)- of Christian religion part of the symbolic values of the nation as well, creating a “religiously informed interpretation of America’s national identity” (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 205). Concern about preserving the characteristics of both religious identity and national identity may form part of a system of “cultural preservation” (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, 2011, 206). When identities are linked in this way, a threat to one group boundary can be perceived as a threat to both identities: “American identity that is infused with Christian religion, conceptions of God, destiny, and religious heritage is a complex identity that, to be maintained, has to fulfill dual roles of adhering to religious beliefs while maintaining national pride” (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 213). In the context of the United States, those with exclusive religious values who seek to preserve the characteristics of their religious group should also be more likely to want to preserve the boundaries of the national group. Therefore, those holding exclusive values will also be more likely to believe that the United States is founded on Christian values. This is a value of national identity, not political or even religious, as it defines the national group as Christian, rather than expressing a desire to make it so.

Those who hold exclusive religious values and want to preserve the cohesion of their religious group should also be more concerned about defending the boundaries of the national group from threats. As mentioned earlier, values of “solidarity and cohesion” attempt “to guard against internal and external threats” (Rathbun et al. 2016, 125), and people seeking to defend the cohesiveness of their group are sensitive to threats to a group’s symbols (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015, 204). Religious traditionalists are particularly concerned with the need to defeat evil and defend the national group (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008, 310) by

maintaining cohesion. This leads one to hold less cooperative preferences (Herrmann Isernia Segatti 2009, 728) and to have an increased willingness to use force to protect against disorder (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128). Those who hold exclusive religious values should be particularly sensitive to potential threats to the national group. Therefore, those with exclusive religious values should be particularly concerned about defense of the nation and therefore be more likely to identify with a right to forceful self-defense as a national value.

Exclusive national values are not the only potential national values, however. An individual may still profess an attachment to a national group without believing strongly in either chauvinism or culturalism (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009). An inclusive value is one which de-emphasizes the differences between people inside the religion and outside, and attempts to reduce the boundaries, even if it risks the current definition of the group changing. Therefore, characteristics of the national group being open and supportive of differences could be considered inclusive national values. I will focus on one inclusive national value, that of defining cultural, racial, and religious diversity as a core value of the nation.

Inclusive religious values are associated with inclusive national values. A belief in equality and concern for equal treatment and partnership of all people leads to the concept of altruism (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829-830). This is “premised on caring for others and avoiding harm” and “a desire to protect and aid marginalized others” through which “virtuous actions are those what alleviate pain, provide care and avoid causing harm” (Rathbun, Powers, and Anders 2019, 525). A “commitment to equality” also increases concern for fairness or reciprocity (Rathbun, Powers, and Anders 2019, 526). This should lead holders of inclusive religious values to have less concern about preserving the distinctiveness of the national group.

Historically, preserving Christian distinctiveness is not the only religious feature of

American national identity. There is also a more universalistic version, which fits better with a commitment to equality, that the US is “divinely ordained to bring good things to others” (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 212). “[T]he purpose of the nation” is not to maintain a specific set of characteristics in order to preserve cohesion from threats but rather “meeting the needs and interests of the individual and those of fellow citizens” (Hanson and O’Dwyer 2019, 791). For example, some Mainline Protestants in the United States hold the view that God’s support for the United States depends on the country aiding groups which they consider marginalized (Brown and Brown 2015, 498). This fits with a concept of American identity based on a desire “to spread equality” (Hanson and O’Dwyer 2019 ,790). This view separates personal religion, which may have distinct boundaries, and the religious content of national identity, which is based on a universalistic equality. In other words, this view does not consider the US a Christian nation (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 227).

Those with a religious belief in equality should be more likely to have this more universalistic view of American national identity. A belief in “obligations of distributive justice owed to all people...will extend the boundaries of distributive justice to the world as a whole” (Bayram 2017, 136). In other words, a belief in equality leads to expanding “moral circle” to consider more people as part of an in-group (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015, 205) and the “acceptance of and concern for other individuals (known and unknown), groups, society writ large, and even the global community;” Ratbun et al 2016, 127). Therefore, those with inclusive religious values will evaluate their national group and their own identity within that group according to universalistic standards. They should de-emphasize the differences between their national group and others and value openness to difference. They should have less concern for preservation of particular characteristics for cohesion that for which exclusive value

holders have concern. Therefore, those who hold inclusive religious values should be more likely to consider diversity a core national value as it represents a breaking down of particular boundaries to define the group in more universal terms.

Values and Views on Israel

If exclusive and inclusive religious values can affect whether or not a person holds exclusive or inclusive national values, as I have argued, how might such national values affect foreign policy preferences? Previous research has shown how religious values may affect politics by way of impacting national values (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018, 165). Exclusive national values will lead to a greater likelihood of sympathy for Israel because Israel is an ally, because of anti-Muslim sentiment, and because of pro-Jewish sentiment. Inclusive national values will lead to a reduced likelihood of sympathy for Israel because the universalistic conception of national identity will lead to a greater desire to consider the needs of both sides and a reduced perception of threat from groups perceived as out-groups (Muslims).

The first reason for which I expect holders of exclusive national values to sympathize primarily with Israel is that holders of exclusive national values, as I have defined them above, are particularly concerned about defending the national group from threats (Kertzer et al. 2014, 830; Rathbun et al. 2016, 125). For example, biblical inerrancy, which may indicate a concern for preserving unique religious truth has previously been shown to be related to a preference for a greater use of the military in foreign policy (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008, 308). So, holders of exclusive national values will be more likely to form foreign policy preferences based on what keeps the national group safe.

Exclusive national values are concerned about preserving the boundaries of the group, or

the groups unique characteristics, and are not universalist; however, outside groups which are helpful to keeping the nation safe may be seen favorably. Most obviously, national identity can generate warm attitudes towards allies of one's own nation but dislike of countries which are perceived as enemies (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009, 727, 741). Even though alliances may primarily be functional, some kind of emotional attachment to allies may develop as allies assist in the defense of the in-group (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009, 747). Similarly, a strong attachment to defending the nation's current characteristics may be associated with support for current government policies (Schildkraut 2014, 443). Since allies are countries which the government has a policy of friendship, those with exclusive national values may be more likely to see allies more favorably. Further strengthening these effects, since allies strengthen the national group, those with exclusive national values may additionally value the defense of the allies against those who oppose those allies. Therefore, holders of exclusive national values will be more likely to sympathize with Israel, an allied country with which the government is very close, and less likely with the Palestinians, who oppose them (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019, 1008, 1016).

The second reason for which I expect holders of exclusive national values to be more likely to sympathize with Israel is a perception of a shared threat from Muslims (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019, 1008, 1016-7). As with the alliance mechanism, holders of exclusive national values are particularly concerned about external threats as defined above (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128; Herrmann 2017, 62). This may make them particularly concerned about the potential of terrorism by Muslims (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2009, 1019). Those who emphasize the public role of Christianity in the United States often have less favorable opinions of Muslims (Shortle and Gaddie 2015). Muslims are often seen as an outgroup in the United States (Kalkan,

Layman, and Uslaner 2009) and exclusive values will reduce concern for the outgroup in order to protect the ingroup (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 653). Therefore, holders of exclusive national values should perceive a greater threat from Muslims and therefore become more likely to sympathize with to Israel because it is the rival of the predominately Muslim Palestinians (Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd 2020).

The third reason for which I expect that holders of exclusive national values are more likely to sympathize with Israel, rather than a utilitarian consideration against a common threat, is a sense of cultural affinity with Israeli Jews. There may be both relative and absolute affinity. First, those who hold the exclusive national value that the United States is based on Christianity may be more likely to sympathize with Israel because the Jewish Israelis are seen as *relatively* more like American Christians than the predominantly Muslim Palestinians (Guth 2011, 8-13). Second, there may be absolute affinity that involves a partial identification with Judaism. Both in the US and globally, Christian sympathy for Israel globally is driven by Protestants and especially Evangelical protestants (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019, 1018). The affinity of Protestant Christians for Israel is often attributed to “Protestant eschatology which ascribes a unique and positive role to the return of the Jews to the land of Israel, along with an emphasis in Protestantism put on bible study including the Hebrew bible” (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019, 1009). More generally, Evangelical Christians often have a more favorable opinion of Jews, due to the Biblical literalist idea that Jews are God’s chosen people. Many Evangelicals extent this belief to the belief non-Jews must favor Jews in order to receive divine blessings (Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd 2020). In terms of theology, these are largely Protestant ideas that are not shared with Catholic and Orthodox Christians (BenLevi, Cavari, and Terris 2019, 1018); however, exclusive national values are aspects of national identity, not theology. Holders of exclusive national

values are concerned with preserving the characteristics of the nation in order to maintain cohesion against threats: religious concepts have been added to national identity over centuries, drawing on a generic form of religion, not attached to a particular denomination (Bellah 1967). So, while these affinity for Jews may derive from particular forms of Christianity, it may be attached to national identity without belief in the underlying religious concepts. Therefore, Americans who hold exclusive national values should be more likely to sympathize with Israel because of an affinity for Israeli Jews.

In sum, I hypothesize that exclusive religious values are positively related to exclusive national values, due to a concern about preserving the boundaries of a linked religious and national identity. These are associated with an increased likelihood of sympathizing with Israel relative to the Palestinians, due to the alliance, perceived threat from Muslims, and affinity for Jews. In other words, there will be a relationship of exclusive religious values and sympathy for Israel which will be mediated through exclusive national values.

Hypothesis 1: Exclusive religious values will have a positive effect on sympathy for Israel which is mediated through exclusive national values.


Conversely, inclusive national values should have the reverse effect from exclusive national values because they counteract the above three reasons. Holders of inclusive national values de-emphasize the necessity of defending boundaries; they are less concerned with defending the characteristics of the national group to protect from the threat of out-groups and more concerned about expanding a sense of universal justice (Bayram 2017, 136). A national identity which is not concerned about maintaining boundaries is associated with a cooperative international outlook (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009); being relatively less concerned about outside threat, the impact of the alliance on conflict sympathies is reduced. Combined with

the fact that inclusive national values increase concern about the welfare of out-groups (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128; Bayram 2017, 136), negative views of Muslims should be weaker. While inclusive national values would not necessarily reduce favorable opinions of Jews, they would reduce the likelihood of a relative preference for Jews over Muslims as well as reduce the likelihood of defining the nation in terms tied to Biblical literalist views of Jews. Finally, since inclusive national values increase concern about the outgroups, inclusive national values may increase relative sympathy for Palestinians precisely because they are perceived as more different. In light of my expectations about the relationship between religious and national values, I hypothesize that inclusive religious values are positively related to inclusive national values which are associated with a decreased likelihood of sympathizing with Israel relative to the Palestinians. Therefore, there is a negative relationship of inclusive religious values and sympathy for Israel which will be mediated through inclusive national values.

Hypothesis 2: Inclusive religious values will have a negative effect on sympathy for Israel which is mediated through inclusive political values.

My expectations are made with reference to whether or not an individual has greater sympathy with Israel than for the Palestinians rather than some more specific policy. This is to simplify the mechanisms at work. Sympathy is, admittedly, unspecific. An individual may associate different outcomes to the conflict as compatible with favoring Israel in the conflict. However, many factors may go into forming more specific preferences, such as how feasible the individual thinks each option is. Forming preferences over more specific policy outcomes is more information intensive. By focusing on general sympathy in the conflict, I hope to capture a foreign policy preference which requires relatively little information about specific situations on the ground and thereby control for the effect of information.

Figure A: Theoretical Mechanisms



I have also not discussed the role of leadership cues or partisanship in shaping sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As mentioned above, previous research has suggested that these factors matter for the formation of preferences in the conflict. I am not arguing that leadership cues or partisanship do not matter for the formation of preferences in the conflict, but that the impact of religious values on foreign policy preferences through national values exists in addition to the impact of leadership cues and partisanship. My argument should be seen as something which exists alongside the impact of cues and partisanship, rather than supplanting them. Moreover, the same religious and partisan leadership cues which impact conflict sympathies might also impact religious values and national values. Many effects may be present, and I leave it to future research to find out the precise relationship between leadership cues,

partisanship, and the values effects I hypothesize here.

Data and Methods

I now turn towards testing the hypotheses. The variables of interest were captured with data from the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll in May 2017 (Telhami and Rouse 2017). I estimate the dependent variable, conflict sympathies, with a question asking with whom the respondent sympathizes more, the choices being Israel, the Palestinians, both, or neither.

I estimate the independent variable, religious values, with three indicators. As mentioned above, I am studying two exclusive religious values, the duty towards coreligionists and the duty for evangelism, and one inclusive religious value, equality duty. These are measured with questions asking whether each in a series of statements was very, somewhat, slightly, or not at all close to the respondent's own view. These were condensed into binary responses of whether or not the respondent was very or somewhat close relative to slightly or not at all close. The statement for the duty to coreligionists was "I have a greater responsibility to be concerned about the well-being of people who share my religious or spiritual beliefs than about the well-being of people with other beliefs." The statement for evangelism duty was "My religious or spiritual beliefs require me to convince other people who do not share my beliefs that my beliefs are the truth." The statement for equality duty was "My own religious or spiritual beliefs require me to treat others equally without differentiating based on the religious or spiritual beliefs of others."

I also measure national values with three indicators. As mentioned above, I am focusing on two exclusive national values. These are, first, whether or not respondents identify the United States as a Christian nation and, second, whether or not respondents

identify self-defense with force as a core national value. I additionally focus on one inclusive national value, whether or not respondents identify cultural, racial, and religious diversity as a core national value. The first is measured by affirming that: “The United States at its core represents Christian values, and public policy should reflect Christian values”, representing a desire to defend symbolic Christian heritage in the country (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018, 147). Respondents were asked whether or not they preferred that statement to a more multicultural alternative (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001, 76): “The United States at its core represents equality between different religions, and public policy should reflect the religious or spiritual viewpoints of all citizens equally.” Those who chose the first response are coded as having the exclusive national value of identifying the country with Christianity. The indicators for both self-defense and diversity come from asking respondents “how important to core American values” each of the concepts were. Respondents could rate each value as very important, somewhat important, slightly important. These have been simplified to a binary indicator of whether or not the respondent rated the value “very” or “somewhat important” contrasted against those that rated the value only “slightly” or not important.

I estimate logistic regression models for the impact of each of the two exclusive religious values on each of the two exclusive national values (Models 1-8). I also estimate a logistic regression model for the impact of the inclusive religious value on the inclusive national value (Models 9-12). Then, I estimate a model estimating the impact of the national values on the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel (Models 13-16). Finally, I use mediation analysis to examine whether the impact of the religious values is mediated through the effect on national values.

Several key controls are considered. First and foremost, because of the

overarching importance of partisanship, every model controls for partisanship. I calculate each model four times: once for the whole sample and ones for Republicans, Democrats, and independents separately. For the models predicting conflict sympathies, to distinguish between respondents engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the issue public (Krosnick and Telhami 1995), from those who care little about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, respondents were also asked how concerned they are about the conflict. Other common controls, race, age, gender, and partisan and religious denomination were also applied. (Evangelicals are those Protestants who self-identify as such. Self-identified Born-Again Christians who do not also consider themselves Evangelical are considered a distinct group, following Telhami (2014).)

The surveys were carried out May 19-22, 2017, through Nielsen Scarborough, which recruited from its probability-based national panel a probability-based representative sample of 2,616 respondents from the national probability-based panel. The national panel was itself recruited by mail and telephone with a random sample of households from Survey Sampling International. Responses were weighted by age, gender, income, education, race, and geographic region using benchmarks from the US Census as well as by partisan identification. Because the surveys are weighted, the models are also weighted. Accordingly, binary logistic regression models are estimated with the `{survey}` (Lumley 2004; 2019) package inside R software (R Core Team 2019; 2020). The mediation analysis is carried out with the `{mediation}` package (Tingley et al. 2014) and its results appear in Appendix 1, Table 3. Coefficient tables for all models testing the hypotheses appear in Appendix 1, Table 1, using the `{stargazer}` package (Hlavac 2018). Simulated changes in predicted probabilities for the regression models

appear in Appendix 1, Table 2, with plots in Appendix 2. (These are calculated according to the average marginal effect/observed value method (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013) using the {DAMisc}, {dplyr}, and {calibrate} packages [Armstrong 2020; Wickham et al. 2010; Graffelman 2019]). Summary statistics appear in Appendix 3. The full text of the questions appears in Appendix 4. Additional models testing the mechanisms linking religious and national values, on the one hand, and national values and conflict sympathies, on the other hand, appear in Appendix 5. Finally, plots of the changes in predicted probabilities estimated by those additional models appear in Appendix 6.

Results

There is fairly strong, though imperfect, evidence in favor of the relationship between exclusive religious and exclusive national values. Holding either exclusive religious value (coreligionist duty or evangelism duty) is positively correlated with the likelihood of holding one exclusive national value, the belief that the country is based on Christian values, for the whole sample (Model 1 and Figure 1). Coreligionist duty increases the likelihood of believing that the United States is based on Christian values by .07 and evangelism duty does so by .08 (Model 1 and Figure 2). However, despite this result for the full sample, the relationship was not significant in the subsets (Models 2-4; Figures 1-2).

Relationship of Coreligionist Duty and Christian Values as a National Value




Figure 1

Relationship of Evangelism Duty and Christian Values as a National Value




Figure 2

For the likelihood of holding the second exclusive national value, defense by force, only holding one of the exclusive religious values, evangelism duty, was significantly correlated in the whole sample (Model 5 and Figure 4), increasing the predicted probability of holding defense as a national value by .08. It was also significant among Republicans (Model 6 and Figure 4), with evangelism duty increasing the predicted probability of holding defense as a national value

by .06, but it was not significant among Democrats or Independents (Models 7-8 and Figure 4). In contrast to evangelism duty, holding the other exclusive religious value, coreligionist duty, was not significantly correlated in the whole sample with the likelihood of holding defense as a national value (Model 5 and Figure 3), but it was significant among Democrats (Model 7 and Figure 3). Among Democrats, coreligionist duty was associated with an increase in the predicted probability of holding defense as a national value by .17. Thus, three of the four relationships between the two exclusive religious values and the two exclusive national values examined were significant and positive in the full sample, and the one exception was nevertheless significant among Democrats. Therefore, there is reasonable evidence to conclude that exclusive religious values and exclusive national values are positively associated.

Relationship of Coreligionist Duty and Defense as a National Value




Figure 3

Relationship of Evangelism Duty and Defense as a National Value




Figure 4

Similarly, holding the inclusive religious value, equality, was significantly correlated with the likelihood of holding the inclusive national value, diversity, in the full sample (Model 9 and Figure 5). Equality duty substantially increased the predicted probability of holding diversity as a national value, a .14 change in the full sample. Among the Republican and Democratic subsets (Models 10 and 11 and Figure 5), the increases in predicted probability were by .12 and

.14, respectively. Holding inclusive or exclusive religious values, therefore, is significantly and substantively correlated with holding inclusive or exclusive national values, respectively.




Figure 5

There is also evidence that holding in exclusive national values are associated with a greater likelihood of sympathizing with Israel. Holding either of the exclusive national values significantly increased the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel in the whole sample (Model 13

and Figures 6-7). Believing that the United States is founded on Christian values increased the predicted probability of sympathizing with Israel by a substantial amount, .18 (Model 13 and Figure 6). This held for all subsets, (Models 14-6 and Figure 6), increasing the predicted probability for Republicans by .16, for Democrats by .12, and for Independents by .28. Holding the other exclusive national value, defense, increased the predicted probability of sympathizing with Israel by .16 for the full sample (Model 13 and Figure 7), .30 for Republicans (Model 14 and Figure 7), and .11 for Democrats (Model 15 and Figure 7). (Defense as a national value was not significant for sympathizing with Israel among Independents [Model 16 and Figure 7].) This is strong evidence of a positive and substantively significant relationship between exclusive national values and sympathizing primarily with Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

Relationship of Christian Values as a National Value and Sympathy for Israel




Figure 6

Relationship of Defense as a National Value and Sympathy for Israel




Figure 7

There is similarly strong evidence for the reverse effect of holding the inclusive national value, diversity. Holding diversity as a national value significantly decreased the predicted probability of sympathizing with Israel for the whole sample (Model 13 and Figure 8), decreasing the predicted probability by .09. Holding the inclusive national value also significantly decreased the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel among Republicans (Model 14

and Figure 8), decreasing the predicted probability of sympathizing with Israel by .15. The relationship was not significant among Democratic and Independent subsets (Models 15-6 and Figure 8). Still, the results for the full sample and Republicans provide reasonable evidence that there is a negative relationship between inclusive national values and sympathizing primarily with Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.




Figure 8

The logistic regression models show evidence for the two-step process laid out in the theory. First, there is a relationship between whether a person holds exclusive or inclusive religious values and whether a person holds, respectively, exclusive or inclusive national values. Second, exclusive national values increase the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel while inclusive national values decrease the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel. Next, I turn to the mediation analysis to provide more direct evidence for the hypotheses that the religious values have significant effects on a respondent's views and likelihood of sympathizing with Israel which are mediated through national values. I find some, though imperfect, support for both hypotheses in the mediation analyses (Table 1). One exclusive national value, the belief that the United States is founded on Christian values, did significantly mediate the relationship between each of the two exclusive religious values and the likelihood of sympathizing primarily with Israel. However, the mediation was not significant in any particular party subset. Conversely, the other exclusive national value, defense, was not found to mediate any relationship between either of the exclusive religious values and the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel for the sample as a whole. Despite this, defense as a national value did mediate a relationship between of coreligionist duty on sympathizing with Israel for Democrats and between evangelism duty and sympathizing with Israel for the Republicans. Finally, the inclusive national value of diversity did significantly mediate a negative relationship between the inclusive religious value of equality and the likelihood of sympathizing with Israel for the sample as a whole. It was not significant in the subsets, however. Thus, while not every subset showed a statistically significant mediation of every religious value from every national value, there is still reasonable evidence to support the hypotheses.

Table 1: Mediation Analysis Results

Treatment	Mediator	ACME Treated	95% C.I. Min. (ACME)	95% C.I. Max. (ACME)	p (ACME)	Significance (ACME)	Total Effect	95% C.I. Min. (Total)	95% C.I. Max. (Total)	p (Total)	Significance (Total)	Subset
Coreligionist Duty	Christian Values	0.014	0.001	0.030	0.032	*	0.109	0.039	0.184	0.002	**	All
Evangelism Duty	Christian Values	0.016	0.001	0.034	0.032	*	0.058	-0.025	0.141	0.172		All
Coreligionist Duty	Defense Value	0.008	-0.004	0.021	0.166		0.103	0.027	0.178	0.004	**	All
Evangelism Duty	Defense Value	0.011	-0.001	0.023	0.070	+	0.053	-0.036	0.136	0.240		All
Equality Duty	Diversity Value	-0.012	-0.026	-0.002	0.012	*	-0.009	-0.077	0.056	0.816		All
Coreligionist Duty	Christian Values	0.013	-0.005	0.036	0.140		0.138	0.026	0.236	0.014	*	Republicans
Evangelism Duty	Christian Values	0.019	-0.003	0.049	0.098	+	0.084	-0.029	0.197	0.160		Republicans
Coreligionist Duty	Defense Value	0.001	-0.023	0.022	0.866		0.124	0.020	0.223	0.022	*	Republicans
Evangelism Duty	Defense Value	0.021	0.003	0.043	0.018	*	0.082	-0.037	0.203	0.166		Republicans
Equality Duty	Diversity Value	-0.016	-0.039	-0.0001	0.050	+	0.057	-0.043	0.151	0.270		Republicans
Coreligionist Duty	Christian Values	0.003	-0.011	0.025	0.696		0.073	-0.034	0.206	0.218		Democrats
Evangelism Duty	Christian Values	0.016	-0.001	0.051	0.072	+	0.038	-0.074	0.182	0.602		Democrats
Coreligionist Duty	Defense Value	0.020	0.004	0.039	0.010	*	0.091	-0.018	0.211	0.106		Democrats
Evangelism Duty	Defense Value	0.001	-0.021	0.020	0.888		0.023	-0.093	0.171	0.774		Democrats
Equality Duty	Diversity Value	0.003	-0.019	0.023	0.630		-0.064	-0.179	0.038	0.252		Democrats
Coreligionist Duty	Christian Values	0.047	-0.014	0.134	0.146		0.129	-0.041	0.306	0.158		Independents
Evangelism Duty	Christian Values	-0.014	-0.068	0.042	0.568		0.122	-0.096	0.371	0.288		Independents
Coreligionist Duty	Defense Value	-0.005	-0.034	0.012	0.640		0.075	-0.075	0.238	0.366		Independents
Evangelism Duty	Defense Value	0.006	-0.011	0.031	0.542		0.139	-0.071	0.381	0.236		Independents
Equality Duty	Diversity Value	-0.010	-0.041	0.010	0.346		-0.016	-0.175	0.136	0.866		Independents

I must also note that in all but one of these relationships, the “total effect”, the combined direct effect and mediated effect of religious values on sympathizing with Israel, was not significant. The only exception was that the coreligionist duty has a significant total effect on sympathizing with Israel when modeling a mediated effect through belief that the United States

was founded on Christian values. This mediating relationship, therefore, remains clearly supported. While the other relationship may appear to be less well supported according to the traditional use of mediation analysis, this is not necessarily the case. Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) show that a significant total effect is not necessary for the mediator to significantly mediate a relationship between the treatment and outcome. Thus, I find support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: exclusive and inclusive national values mediate the relationship between their corresponding type of religious values and sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Further Examination of the Relationship between Religious and National Values

I have shown that exclusive religious values make a person more likely to hold exclusive national values, which make a person more likely to sympathize with Israel. I have also shown that inclusive religious values make a person more likely to hold inclusive national values, which make a person less likely to sympathize with Israel. The logic that exclusive religious values make a person more likely to hold exclusive national values is based on the idea that exclusive religious values are related to a greater perception of external threats. A threat to the national group is a threat to the religious group because the concept of American national identity has so often been tied to religious concepts (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 213). The logic that inclusive religious values make a person more likely to hold inclusive national values is that a religious belief in equality leads people to consider more people inside within an individual's moral concerns (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015, 205; Ratbun et al 2016, 127). In this section, I will demonstrate these mechanisms by showing that the relationship between exclusive religious values and exclusive national values is stronger among older Americans and that the relationship between inclusive religious values and inclusive national

values is stronger among those with foreign relatives.

For exclusive religious values to generate exclusive national values, they should form part of a shared threat perception; that is, that a threat to one is seen as a threat to both. The identities are linked (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011, 205-6, 213). Traditionally, American political discourse often drew on some generalized Christian themes, creating a link between the two (Bellah 1967; Wuthnow 1988, 244). However, in recent decades, religion, especially in conservative forms, has become increasingly associated with political conservatism, rather than being a unifying idea. Also, secularism has become increasingly associated with the political left, particularly since 2000 (Layman and Weaver 2016, 279). Since in recent decades Christianity and American national identity have not been linked as closely as they were earlier, older Americans should have a stronger link between the two as they came of age before religion was divisive. Because older Americans will have a stronger link between religious and national identity, they will more likely perceive a threat to one identity as being a threat to the other. If exclusive religious values generate exclusive national values because of this link between religious and national identity, then the impact of exclusive religious values on exclusive national values will be stronger among older Americans.

I find evidence of such an interaction effect between exclusive religious values and age. Nielsen Scarborough measures the age of respondents in 5-year increments. I code as older those Americans in the second half of these categories, those 45 and older, who were already in their late 20s in 2000 and compare them to those who are younger. I find that among those under 45, exclusive religious values increase the predicted probability of exclusive national values by a small and statistically insignificant amount. However, the effect is much larger and statistically significant among those 45 and older. For example, the change in predicted the probability of

believing the US is founded on Christian values due to believing in coreligionist duty is .03 among those under 45 but .11 for those 45 and older. (See Figures 9-12; see also Appendices 5-6). This provides evidence that the mechanism linking exclusive religious values and exclusive national values is due to these identities having been traditionally linked and, therefore, additional evidence of the relationship between exclusive religious and exclusive national values.

Interaction of Coreligionist Duty and Age and the Predicted Probability of Christian Values as a National Value




Figure 9

Interaction of Evangelism Duty and Age and the Predicted Probability of Christian Values as a National Value




Figure 10

Interaction of Coreligionist Duty and Age the Predicted Probability of and Defense as a National Value




Figure 11




Figure 12

For inclusive national values, the mechanism is that a religious belief in equality encourage a universalistic view of American national identity because a sense of altruism and fairness (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829-830) leads them to have a belief in moral obligations outside the nation (Bayram 2017, 136; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015, 205; Ratbun et al 2016, 127). If this is so, then this relationship between inclusive and exclusive national

values should be stronger among those who have greater personal ties outside the United States. These overseas ties would make them especially likely to expand their moral concern to those outside the country and to tie this to their identity.

I find some evidence for this (Figures 13-4). Among those without foreign relatives, equality duty increases the predicted probability of holding diversity as a national value by .16, compared to .224 among those with foreign relatives. This is not, however, statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, but it is close. Importantly, those with foreign relatives who do not also hold inclusive religious values are less likely than those without foreign relatives but who hold inclusive religious values to hold inclusive national values. So, it is not just a matter of having overseas relatives giving someone a universalistic national identity. Hence, while not as strong as the evidence for the relationship between exclusive religious values and exclusive national value based on the overlapping identities, there is some reason to believe that inclusive religious values increase the likelihood of inclusive national values by generating a universalistic sense of identity. In sum, the mechanisms behind the relationship of exclusive religious values and exclusive national values, on the one hand, and inclusive religious values and inclusive national values, on the other, have some evidence supporting them. This provides additional support that there is a relationship between religious values and national values of each type.

Interaction of Equality Duty and Foreign Relatives and Diversity as a National Value




Figure 13

Interaction of Equality Duty and Foreign Relatives and Diversity as a National Value (90% Confidence)




Figure 14

Further Examination of the Relationship between National Values and Conflict

Sympathies

Having illustrated some of the mechanisms behind the relationship between religious and national values, I now turn to the mechanisms behind national values and sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. I have argued that exclusive national values are associated with a

greater likelihood of sympathy for Israel because Israel is an ally, because of anti-Muslim sentiment, and because of pro-Jewish sentiment. Moreover, I have argued that inclusive national values are associated with a reduced likelihood of sympathy for Israel because those with a universalistic conception of national identity have a greater desire to consider the needs of both sides and also perceive less through from out-groups (Muslims).

First, I find evidence that some of the relationship between exclusive national values and conflict sympathy is due to the alliance with Israel. In the same survey, respondents were also asked on a 4-point scale whether or not they were favorable to each of nine Middle Eastern countries. Converting this to a binary variable with somewhat and highly favorable being 1 and somewhat and highly unfavorable being 0, I run logistic regression models. (See Appendices 5-6). As follows from the primary results, those with exclusive national values are more likely to hold a favorable view of Israel and less likely to hold a favorable view of Palestine (Figures 15-8). However, those that hold defense as a national value are also more likely to hold a favorable view of Saudi Arabia another well-known ally in the region (Figure 19). Democrats who hold defense as a national value are also more likely to hold a favorable view of Egypt (Figure 20). Since affinity for those Arab Muslim countries (and not Palestine) cannot be explained by cultural or religious affinities, I conclude that at least holding defense as a national value increases favorability towards allies. Therefore, this likely also explains some of the relationship between holding defense as a national value and sympathy for Israel.

Relationship of Christian Values and Favorability towards Israel




Figure 15

Relationship of Defense as a National Value and Favorability towards Israel




Figure 16

Relationship of Christian Values and Favorability towards Palestine




Figure 17

Relationship of Defense as a National Value and Favorability towards Palestine




Figure 18

Relationship of Defense as a National Value and Favorability towards Saudi Arabia




Figure 19

Relationship of Defense as a National Value and Favorability towards Egypt




Figure 20

Second, I find evidence that some of the relationship between exclusive national values and conflict sympathy is due to negative views of Muslims. At the same time, I find evidence that some of the relationship between inclusive national values and conflict sympathy is due to more positive views of Muslims. Respondents were asked to what extent they sympathized with the Jews, Muslims, and Christians across Israel and Palestine. Immediately prior to this question,

respondents were reminded that there are Christian minorities among both Palestinians and among Israeli citizens as well as a Muslim minority among Israeli citizens. So, this question should at least somewhat capture views of the religions, not simply the two sides. I convert this to a dummy variable for sympathy and run logistic regression models. I have found that those who believe the US is founded on Christian values are less likely to sympathize with Muslims (Figure 21; see also Appendices 5-6), while those who believe diversity is a core national value are more likely to sympathize with Muslims (Figure 22). This suggests that at least some of the relationship between national values and conflict sympathies is due to different perceptions of the Muslim outgroup.

Relationship of Christian Values and Sympathy towards Muslims




Figure 21

Relationship of Diversity as a National Value and Sympathy towards Muslims




Figure 22

Third, I find evidence that cultural affinity generates some of the relationship between exclusive national values and sympathy for Israel. The evidence is clearest for relative affinity, that Israel is more of an in-group than the mostly Muslim Palestinians are. This is because, while exclusive values, specifically the belief that the US was founded on Christian values, decrease the likelihood of sympathy for Muslims, they increase the likelihood of sympathy for Arab

Christians in Israel and Palestine (Figure 23; see also Appendices 5-6). The belief that the US was founded on Christian values also increases the sympathy for Jews in Israel but, the evidence is not as strong. The regression coefficient is significant only at the 90% level, rather than the 95%, and the confidence interval of the change in predicted probability is just outside of zero (Figure 24). The strongest evidence is for exclusive national values to increase sympathy for the Christians while the evidence for Jews is weaker. This may mean that some of the impact of exclusive national values is simply to sympathize with groups seen are more similar to one's own.

Relationship of Christian Values and Sympathy towards Christians




Figure 23

Relationship of Christian Values and Sympathy towards Jews




Figure 24

Despite this, there may also be some absolute affinity for Israeli Jews, as Jews, from those Americans who hold exclusive national values. Respondents were also asked questions about their preferred outcome for the conflict. In one such question, respondents were whether or not were more interested in Israel being a democracy or being a Jewish state. Those who believed that the US is founded on Christian values are more likely to prefer Israel as a Jewish

state to a democratic state (Figure 25; see also Appendices 5-6). This may indicate that Americans with exclusive national values do have some affinity for the Jewish people and that this may be behind part of the relationship of national values and conflict sympathies.




Figure 25

For inclusive national values, I have argued that the inclusive national values make one less likely to sympathize with Israel because of the less perceived threat from Muslims and a

greater universalistic concern for both sides of the conflict. As mentioned before, those with inclusive national values are more likely to sympathize with Muslims. Moreover, respondents were also asked a second question on their preferred outcome for the conflict. They chose between the current situation, a two-state solution, a binational state (in which the Palestinians would be integrated into Israel as citizens), or an annexation of the Palestinian territories in which the Palestinians would not be citizens. The last option would violate a universalistic sense of justice as it definitely denies rights to the Palestinians. Accordingly, those with inclusive national values are significantly less likely to support this option (Figure 26; see also Appendices 5-6). (Exclusive national values have no effect.) This provides evidence that inclusive national values impact conflict sympathies by creating a sense of justice that involves outgroups.

Relationship of Diversity as a National Value and Support for Unequal Annexation




Figure 26

Conclusion

With the case of American views on Israel, I have shown that religious values influence foreign policy preferences by changing the content of national identity. I have shown here that there are at least two different forms of religious values and that there are at least two different forms of national identity which can influence foreign policy views. Exclusive values may do so,

but so may inclusive values. Also, by showing the effects of specific national values, I have shown the importance of breaking down the content of national identity, how individuals define the nation with which they identify. These two findings add to the research on American views of Israel, religion and foreign policy preferences, and national identity content.

These findings also begin to answer the question of why so many Americans strongly favor Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, while at the same time, many do not. Those Americans who are more concerned about maintaining the definition of their religious group, in other words, concerned about protecting religious boundaries, in belief and in religious communities, are similarly concerned about maintaining the definition of their national group. I have presented evidence that suggests that this relationship between exclusive religious and exclusive national values is stronger among Americans 45 and older because the link between is weaker today than it has been in the past. As those Americans who hold exclusive religious and national values seek to preserve the boundaries of their national and religious identities, they sympathize with Israel because they see it as helping preserve their identity.

I have also presented evidence that suggests holders of exclusive national values see Israel as helping preserve their identity for three reasons. Israel is an ally of the United States, and holders of exclusive national values are more favorable to allies, even Saudi Arabia. Second, holders of exclusive national values have less sympathy for Arab Muslims in Israel and Palestine, which may indicate they perceive a common threat from non-allied Muslim groups. Third, those with exclusive national values are more likely to be sympathetic to Arab Christians- and this is better supported than a relationship with sympathy for Israeli Jews- indicating holders of exclusive national values may sympathize with the people most similar to themselves. However, those with exclusive national values are also more likely to prefer Israel maintaining

itself as a Jewish state, so they may also have a specific affinity for the Jewish people. This somewhat corresponds with the findings of Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd (2020) for American Evangelicals and indicates a need for thorough research on cultural affinity between Americans and Israelis more generally.

I have also shown why those many Americans who do not sympathize primarily with Israel do not do so. Some Americans are less concerned with preserving boundaries of their religious group but a sense of fairness. I have presented evidence that such Americans are more likely to have a universal sense of justice which is tied to their national identity. The impact of inclusive religious values is stronger among those with relatives outside the country, suggesting that inclusive religious values operate by making people more concerned about the world as a whole. Such people are less sympathetic to Israel as they are not as concerned about alliances nor do they have negative views of Muslims. Instead, they have more positive views of Muslims and are more likely to oppose outcomes which harm Palestinians. Their religious value of equality impacts their national identity and changes their interpretation of the conflict. Thus, there exists other values which counteract the first set of values in American views of Israel and Palestine.

I do not argue that these factors replace other influences on foreign policy preferences, like leadership cues, or, especially partisanship. Partisanship is still an enormous influence on foreign policy views. To account for this, I have carefully calculated separate results by party for each model. Some results, particularly those involving belief that the US is founded on Christian values, were more strongly supported among Republicans. I believe that this is not because the mechanisms hold only among Republicans but because Democrats are more nearly unanimous on some values. About 90 percent of Democrats hold the religious equality duty and believe diversity is a core American value. A majority of Republicans do as well but there is somewhat

more variance among them. Similarly, more than 90 percent of Republicans believe self-defense is a core national value, while Democrats are more varied. This may explain why the results for self-defense are often better supported among Democrats. Partisanship and religious and national values may be related, and their correlation may make it hard to find strong results for the impact of values which vary little within the parties. However, values and partisanship are conceptually distinct. The fact that I have shown at least some values having an impact on foreign policy within both parties indicates that religious and national values are still worth studying. I leave it to future research to more carefully distinguish these mechanisms.

American views of Israel are at least partially driven by different ideas about what American identity is. Exclusive national values may lead to a greater likelihood of sympathy for Israel and inclusive national values lead to a lower likelihood of sympathy for Israel. These different ideas about American identity are influenced, in part, by at least two different sets of religious values, exclusive and inclusive. As individuals should be expected to feel much more strongly about their own identity than they may know about foreign countries or foreign policy, whether individuals hold inclusive or exclusive religious values may be an important factor in shaping foreign policy preferences more broadly. I leave it to future research to study this relationship beyond the context of American views of Israel.

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